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One major focus of recent value‐pluralist literature has been the question of what normative
consequences follow from pluralism. This essay critically examines three arguments that attempt to
show that either liberalism or a bounded modus vivendi is the state of affairs that pluralism makes
morally preferable. All three arguments are shown to encounter the same fundamental problem—once
we have agreed that values and sets of values are unrankable, any effort to claim that one such set is
morally preferable will inevitably contradict value pluralism, either explicitly or implicitly. If this is
correct, it seems that pluralism leads to relativism.

During the past thirty to forty years, the idea ofvalue pluralism has gotten a lot of attention from
political theorists.1 The basic insight is intuitive andcompelling: it seems that values can conflict with
each other, not only between value systems but evenwithin them. Isaiah Berlin provides a classic and
often quoted statement of the idea: “The world thatwe encounter in ordinary experience is one in
whichwe are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the
realization ofsome of which must inevitably involve the sacrificeof others” (Berlin 1969, 168). A concrete
example isthe one offered by Sartre of the young man who mustchoose between caring for his elderly
mother andjoining the French Resistance. Sartre’s point is thatthese are both compelling duties, that
the young mancannot fulfill both simultaneously, and that there is noobvious way to decide which
should “trump” (Sartre1973, 35‐37).
The academic discussion of value pluralism hasfocused on two main questions. First, are values plural
in the way that Berlin suggests?2 Second, if values areplural, what normative consequences does that
have?In particular, does value pluralism lead to, imply,reveal, or in some other way require some
particularnormative response?3 For example, does the condition of pluralism require us to be especially
attentiveto negative liberty, as Berlin suggests?4 In this article,I assume for the sake of argument that
values areindeed plural and examine what normative consequences (if any) emerge from that plurality.
I look at three representative arguments—onefrom William Galston, one from Bernard Williamsand
George Crowder, and one from John Gray—that attempt, in different ways, to connect pluralism tosome
normative outcome. Galston argues that accepting the truth of plurality makes us unable to justify,
without self‐contradiction, imposing our value preferences on others. Doing so inevitably assumes the
moral superiority of our value system, which we havealready admitted cannot be established. Thus,
societies that respect their citizens’ “expressive liberty” to pursue their own conceptions of the good are
morally preferable to societies that do not. Becauseliberal societies are arguably more likely to respect
expressive liberty than are nonliberal societies, wehave grounds for believing that liberal societies are
morally preferable under conditions of plurality.Bernard Williams suggests, and George Crowder
develops, the idea that if values represent objectivehuman goods, then societies that instantiate more
ofthem are morally better than societies that instantiatefewer. For that reason, liberal societies, whose
emphasis on personal freedom and autonomyarguably makes them likely to permit the pursuit ofthe
widest possible range of values, are morallypreferable to nonliberal societies. Finally, John Grayargues
that although theories such as those of Galston and Williams/Crowder cannot justify their preference for
liberalism, since it is plausible that nonliberal societies may do as good or even a better job than liberal
societies in permitting the expression of a wide range of values, there is nonetheless a kind of universal

minimum morality that constrains the kinds of societies that are morally acceptable under conditions of
pluralism.5 Thus, the best we can hope for is a modus vivendi, but one within limits.
My main contention is that all three of these otherwise quite different efforts to find some normative
consequences in value pluralism rest on the same illegitimate move: all of them implicitly violate the
premise of value pluralism by assuming that some value or combination of values can be treated as
supremely important and therefore capable of rank‐ordering value systems. My more general
conclusion is that there is no way to simultaneously argue for value pluralism and the moral preferability
of a particular value or set of values. The situation is not simply that these three authors make mistakes
of logic but that the problems in their arguments reveal that the task they attempt is impossible.
If that conclusion is correct, it raises serious problems for social cooperation. When we act, either as
individuals or as groups, we inevitably rank the possible alternative courses of action (even if only by
selecting one and lumping the rest together as an undifferentiated second‐best). Moral choice requires
choosing the most moral, or morally most appropriate, course of action. Similarly, political choice
requires a group of people to all live by and obey (to some extent) some common set of values and
value‐reflecting institutions. If there is really no way to rank values or value systems, we may be unable
to agree on the values that should guide our society, with potentially devastating consequences for
social cooperation.

What Value Pluralism Is
The term pluralism has been used in a number of different ways during the past one hundred years.6
Thus, it will be helpful to briefly clarify what I mean by “value pluralism.” First, what do we mean by
values? Although a number of different definitions and characterizations are given in the literature,7
virtually everyone treats “values” as synonymous with moral rights and duties. Thus, Sartre’s famous
dilemma, mentioned above, is moving because joining the French Resistance and caring for one’s elderly
mother are not merely good things—they are things that one ought to do, things that one has a moral
duty
to do. What makes value pluralism philosophically interesting and difficult is the possibility that one
might have conflicting moral obligations and that well‐intentioned and thoughtful people may be unable
to agree on what morality requires in even the most urgent circumstances.
Second, what do we mean by plural? Here again, Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” is the source of
the later literature’s motivating ideas. There, Berlin argues that there is no universal ranking of moral
rights and duties.8 This idea has been unpacked to reveal two parts: the claim that values are plural
because they are incompatible and the claim that they are plural because they are incommensurable.
Values are incompatible when they cannot be put into practice simultaneously. They are
incommensurable when they cannot be expressed either in terms of each other or by reference to a
third term that could serve as a standard unit of measure for comparing them. Thus, if value pluralism is
the case, we are confronted with a situation where we have conflicting moral duties that cannot be put
into a rank order of importance. We will inevitably have to choose which to fulfill and which to leave
unfulfilled, but we will have no principled basis for our decision.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that we are not concerned here with mere empirical
pluralism— the noncontroversial fact that people sometimes disagree about value judgments or find it
difficult to choose between conflicting duties. Rather, we are interested in metaethical pluralism—the
claim that at least some values inevitably conflict with each other, even under conditions of rationality,
good will, and full information.9
In the discussion of the normative consequences of metaethical value pluralism, commentators have
taken three general positions. My brief characterizations of Galston, Williams/Crowder, and Gray have
already sketched two of them. Galston and Williams/ Crowder represent the idea that pluralism leads

to, reveals, or requires some version of liberalism. As I have suggested in passing, I believe that this is
also Berlin’s position.10 John Gray’s position might be called “bounded modus vivendi” and rests on the
claim that pluralism makes it impossible to show that any value system (such as liberalism) is morally
preferable but that there are nonetheless some ways of life that are demonstrably immoral. The best we
can hope for is a modus vivendi—a method of getting along together—within the limits of what is
morally permissible. Thus, we can achieve a partial ranking of possible ways of life, but we cannot
identify a single best value system. The third major response to value pluralism is relativism—the claim
that the fact of pluralism means that there is a large number of differing and incompatible value systems
that cannot be put into any rank order at all. At least in this general version, relativism is distinct from
nihilism—the claim that there are no true moral values, and thus, that differing moral systems cannot be
ranked because they are equally meaningless. Relativism is often a bogey against which other thinkers
argue for some positive normative outcome from pluralism, but some thinkers11 do embrace it more
openly.
These three positions—liberalism, bounded modus vivendi, and relativism—reflect the logically
possible positions with regard to pluralism. Either pluralism reveals or requires some particular norma‐
tive response,12 it gives us some less definite guidance about which actions are acceptable and which are
unacceptable, or it leads to some version of relativism. Another way to say this is that the fact of plu‐
ralism either reveals a comprehensive moral duty (act like this), a limited moral duty (at least do not do
this), or no new moral duty at all (in which case, there is no principled way to resolve the conflicts
between values and value systems).
To assess these various possible consequences of pluralism, we need to distinguish between realist
and irrealist approaches to moral language and knowledge. Some theorists argue for a plurality of real
values. That is, roughly, they believe that our language of moral values refers (more or less well) to
objectively real features of the universe that are at least to some degree independent of human
recognition. On their view, there just happen to be several such values that are not ranked with regard
to each other. This is an ontological or metaphysical claim—our inability to reconcile or commensurate
these values reflects the fact that they do not have any intrinsic rank order. Berlin, Galston, Crowder,
and Gray all take this position.
Other theorists argue that plurality arises precisely from the fact that values are not objective facts
about the human‐independent world. Thus, for example, if we believe that value language refers
ultimately to engrained but contingent cultural traditions, it seems possible (although not inevitable)
that intractable conflicts both within and between traditions could emerge. In this irrealist pluralism, at
least some values and value‐traditions could be permanently (for all practical purposes) unrankable with
regard to each other. 13 The claim of unrankability is an epistemological claim, rather than an ontological
one—it reflects a truth about the relationships among our ideas, not
about relationships among features of the universe, since value language does not refer to any such
thing(s). This position is famously associated with Nietzsche (e.g., Nietzsche 1994).
I argue below that both the realist and irrealist versions of pluralism lead to relativism, because the
hypothesis of pluralism makes impossible any ranking of values or value systems. On this view, whatever
explanation of the cause of metaethical pluralism we prefer, its normative consequences are clear: it
inevitably leads to relativism.

Irrealist Value Pluralism
If values are plural because they are irreal—that is, because they are merely contingent human
constructs rather than objective facts about the universe—then pluralism leads to or reveals moral
relativism quite directly. Again, I want to emphasize that I mean something precise by relativism—it is
an inability to rank values or value systems. Relativism is potentially troubling because it seems to make
moral choice difficult. But it is not the same thing as nihilism—the claim that there simply are no

genuine moral values. How we might respond to the fact of relativism is open to debate. We might
pursue Nietzsche’s fierce avowal of one’s own personal values as an aspect of heroic self‐creation (see
Nietzsche 1994). We might pursue Richard Rorty’s strategy of treating our values as irreal for the sake of
making discussion and compromise easier, while denying that we can really know their metaphysical
status. 14 We might (and almost certainly eventually will) simply impose an arbitrary rank ordering for
the sake of bringing order to chaos. But what we cannot do, consistently, is claim that there is an
intrinsic rank ordering entailed in the values themselves. The fact of their irreality makes any rank
ordering among them inescapably arbitrary—it would be just one more human construct, with no claim
to being superior to any rival ranking.
Of course, if two individuals, or two value‐systems, conflict, it is possible that they may come to
agreement. All of the ordinary resources of persuasion and argument are available here—I can argue
with my opponents that they have misunderstood our common values, or that they are being
inappropriately selfish or shortsighted, or perhaps that although we do not share common values, our
common human experience suggests certain ideals and obligations that we should respect toward one
another. But if these and other appeals fail, as it seems possible that
they may for irrealists, there is no reason to think that there are always other appeals available in
principle that, properly used by competent and honest parties, should result in eventual agreement.
Moral irrealism denies that all rational people must agree in identifying our moral rights and duties and
also that they must agree on how to rank the rights and duties that they contingently do agree on. On
this view, neither liberalism nor any other substantive value or value system is favored by the fact of
pluralism.
If there is no reason for the irrealist to think that value conflicts must in principle be resolvable by
finding some common commitment, perhaps such conflicts can be resolved by an appeal to mutual
toleration, forbearance, or some other structural relationship. That is, perhaps we can find a solution
based on a common response to the fact of plurality rather than on a common positive value. Yet, here
too, there is no reason to think that this solution must be available. Faced with conflict, each party will
inevitably refer back to their own value system (which of course may be narrower or broader, more or
less internally consistent, and so on) to decide how to respond. Those systems may support toleration
and accommodation, or they may support unremitting aggression and hostility. By hypothesis, there is
no necessity that the parties contain any particular attitude toward such conflict, and thus, there is no
reason to believe that they must respond in any particular way. The irrealist perspective does not deny
that a modus vivendi might be achievable—or, for that matter, even universal, contingent moral
agreement—but it does deny that such a resolution must always be available.
Some critics of this irrealist view have argued that this kind of emphasis on context leads to a kind of
Burkean or Oakeshottian conservatism, in which “our way of life” is seen as best not because of its
intrinsic qualities but simply because it is ours, because it is constitutive of our personalities and
institutions (see Gellner 1984; Nyíri 1981). This claim attempts to avoid the apparent relativism of
irrealism by showing that it consistently leads to a particular normative outlook. However, this view
rests on the assumption that ways of life are both internally consistent and hermetically sealed from
contact with outside views—that a given way of life always delineates an unambiguous course of action
and that different ways of life do not share common commitments that could be the basis of discussion.
Since ways of life do not seem to be monolithic in this way, the claim of conservatism is overstated (see
Lugg 1985; Flathman 1992, 58). Irrealism is not committed to the view that
there can be no basis for discussion and agreement between contexts, only that there does not have to
be such a basis in every circumstance.
If values are plural because they are irreal, then there cannot be any intrinsic rank ordering available
to help us cope with pluralism, and we will find ourselves in a condition of relativism. Thus, recognizing

that irrealist metaethical pluralism is the case has no normative consequences at all—it leaves us each
with our initial value commitments and offers us no new guidance about how to live with our
differences.

Realist Value Pluralism
The vast majority of theorists writing about pluralism assume or argue a position of moral realism, in
part to avoid the relativism of irrealism. Thus, I now turn to the question, what, if anything, does realist
pluralism lead to? To put the case as strongly as possible, let us assume that everyone is a realist value
pluralist. Thus, we will put aside the possibilities that people might disagree about whether values are
real, or about the list of real values, or about whether they are genuinely plural, which disagreements
would presumably lead to a wide range of possible outcomes.15 Instead, we will take the ideal case—
everyone agrees that values are real moral rights and duties, everyone agrees on the list of such values,
and everyone agrees that they are irreducibly plural. Does that condition lead to any particular
normative outcome?
In the abstract, it is very hard to see how realist pluralism could lead to, require, or reveal any partic‐
ular normative consequences. By hypothesis, we know what all the real moral values are, and we know
that they cannot be put into rank order. Thus, no one value can trump another. By extension, it seems
obvious that no set of values could trump another set of values, at least as long as the two sets are equal
in number. Thus, if liberty cannot trump equality, and piety cannot trump courage, then liberty plus
piety cannot trump equality plus courage, and so on with the other possible combinations.16 (I address
below the question of whether sets of values that are unequal in number can be ranked against each
other.) The problem is revealed as even harder if we add two additional points, which I believe are
implicit in the conception of moral rights and duties. First, moral goods trump nonmoral goods.
Although there is some controversy about this claim, it largely concerns the nature of morality—
whether our idea of a moral good itself can be defended rigorously.17 Since in this essay I am defending
the strongest version of realist pluralism to see whether that best‐case‐scenario argument can lead to
any normative consequences, I am assuming that our traditional understanding of a moral good is
roughly correct. On that view, the point of calling something a moral right or duty is to say that it has a
superior claim over nonmoral considerations. The second additional problem, which is a consequence of
the first, is that the only thing that could trump a moral good is a superior moral good.18
Given these restrictions, how do pluralist theorists attempt to connect pluralism to some substantive
outcome? The most plausible attempts use structural or emergent strategies, which try to identify some
fact about the plurality of values that reveals a ranking that is not obviously dependent on a rank order
among the values themselves. Here, I look at two such strategies: one used by William Galston and one
briefly suggested by Bernard Williams and later elaborated by George Crowder.

Galston, Pluralism, and Liberalism
William Galston understands the problem of getting from the hypothesis of pluralism to the prefer‐
ability of liberalism or any other value system. He writes in response to a critic: “To begin: it was not my
intention to suggest that by itself, value pluralism entails any form of liberalism. From a purely formal
standpoint, that claim would be bizarre. If value pluralism functions as one premise in the argument,
then surely we must add another premise to have any hope of reaching the desired conclusion” (Galston
2004, 144). He continues: “If as a logical matter we must affirm something in addition to value pluralism
to reach liberal conclusions, what might that something be? One candidate is my conception of
expressive liberty” (Galston 2004, 145).
The idea of expressive liberty is appealing and carefully constructed: “This conception of expressive
liberty is not straightforwardly a particular value. Rather, it reflects a structural fact about human agency

and gains value from the goods that it allows agents to fulfill. An individual is said to enjoy expressive
liberty when surrounding social and political arrangements do not excessively or unnecessarily constrain
the practices that collectively express that individual’s conception of a good life” (Galston 2004, 145).
Galston draws the connection to liberalism in this way: “If this argument is correct, then there is
indeed a link between value pluralism and political liberalism. Value pluralism suggests that there is a
range of indeterminacy within which various choices are rationally defensible. . . . Because there is no
single uniquely rational ordering or combination of such values, no one can provide a generally valid
reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular ranking or combination” (Galston 2002, 56‐57).
This raises a first objection to Galston’s theory: that it is not possible for expressive liberty to be a
nonvalue and yet still do the work that Galston wants it to do. His idea is that if we have, say, one
hundred value systems that are all moral, then we need a good reason to interfere with any of them. In
essence, this is an attempt to place the burden of justification on the enemies of expressive liberty.19 But
of course, the question this raises is, why do we need a justification here? Imagine that we somehow
require the people of way of life number 34 to adopt way of life number 47. By hypothesis, both ways of
life are equally moral, and both are objectively good for the people who lead them. Why do we need to
justify this switch? Galston’s answer seems to be because it violates the expressive liberty of the people
formerly of way of life 34. But that answer would treat expressive liberty as a value—as something that
people have a right to and as something the denial of which needs moral justification. If expressive
liberty is a value, then by hypothesis, it is plural with the other values and has no claim to preeminence.
As a practical necessity, every way of life must rank the various values, instantiating some and ignoring
or downplaying others. If expressive liberty ends up at the bottom of the heap, and thus, gets ignored or
violated by a society’s practices (since by hypothesis, we cannot instantiate all genuine values at once),
there is no reason consistent with value pluralism to object. Thus, if expressive liberty is a value, it
cannot confer rank order on value systems because it is plural with other values and has no claim to
preeminence. If expressive liberty is not a value, then it is irrelevant because it cannot be the basis of a
claim that a justification is needed for our hypothetical switch.
A second objection is that violating someone’s expressive liberty does not (necessarily) involve
implicitly assuming that one’s own value system is superior to theirs, which would obviously be self‐
contradictory for a pluralist to assume .20 Imagine that Jane helps her terminally ill husband commit
suicide because doing so is permitted (or even required) by her value system. Unfortunately, Jane lives
in a society with a different value system, which treats assisted suicide as murder. When arrested, Jane
argues that the society is violating her expressive liberty by punishing her for doing something that is
permissible in her conception of the good, which allinvolved agree is based on genuine moral values.
Therest of her society counters that while they recognizethat Jane has a different and valid value
system, thecohesion of any society requires a uniform set of lawsand prohibitions. The society is not
claiming that itsvalue system is morally better than Jane’s but ratherthat social cooperation would be
impossible withouteveryone acting in accordance with a single conception of the good. The basis of
their justification forconstraining Jane’s freedom to follow her own conception of the good is practical
rather than moral.Jane might retort that in essence, her society is sayingthat Jane has incorrectly ranked
compassion aboveachieving civic unity and is thus implicitly arguingthat its different ranking is better
than hers. Thesociety’s response can be clarified if we imagine thatinstead of seeking to punish Jane it
sought to expelher. The society’s claim would not be that Jane hadacted immorally nor that she had
failed to value civicunity properly but rather that her willingness to violate the laws makes continued
cooperation with herimpossible, since the other members of society cannot predict how she will
behave. In short, they are nolonger willing to live with her. However, if Janewould like to remain a
member of the society, she cansubmit to the criminal punishment for murder, whichthe society will
view as rehabilitating her as amember in good standing.

Galston acknowledges that such reasons might bepossible: “It is not my view that no such reason ever
exists. It may be the case that the costs to society,measured along another dimension, of not imposinga
single way of life on all are so compelling as tooverride citizens’ endorsement of competing alternatives”
(Galston 2004, 146). However, he insists that“the authorities are obligated to make that case”(Galston
2004, 146). This raises a third objection toGalston’s argument: that he cannot give an adequate
argument for placing the burden of justification. If asociety contains two value systems—for example,
one that permits freedom of religion and one thatdoes not—one or the other will win the political
struggle for the right to institutionalize its preferences. Even though both value systems are equally
moral in that both are based on genuine values,Galston’s argument suggests that if the adherents ofthe
value system that forbids freedom of religioncome to power, they will need to justify their plans to
restrict religious freedom, because those plans wouldviolate the expressive liberty of other citizens. But
ofcourse, the victors could equally well claim thatallowing religious freedom violates their expressive
liberty to pursue their conception of the good. Thefact that the two value systems are equally moral
makes it impossible to decide which owes the other ajustification for its preferences—there is no princi‐
pled ground for assuming that one value system isdoing something suspect.
If we claim that the burden of justification alwayslies with the person or institution that violates
someone else’s expressive liberty, the argument is circular:it assumes that expressive liberty is entitled
to presumptive priority as one premise in an argumentintended to establish exactly that priority. If we
claimthat the burden of justification lies with the personwhose expressive liberty is violated, then the
argument is pointless, since that person will presumablyalways lose (with the possible exception of
Gandhi‐like figures who can shame their adversaries intochanging their minds). Finally, if we claim that
theburden must be placed differently according to context, then the question is irresolvable, since the
opposing sides will always disagree about where it shouldbe placed and about who should decide. If
values aregenuinely plural, and if two value systems clash, thereis no way to say that one bears the
burden of justifying its imposition on the other without there beingsome universally applicable moral
principle thatimposes that burden, but the existence of such preeminent values is ruled out by the
premise of plurality.
Thus, although Galston intends to avoid theobvious self‐contradiction of asserting that expressive
liberty is a preeminent value, it cannot do thework of ranking value systems unless it is preciselythat. If
expressive liberty is not a moral value, thenit is merely a preference and does not bear any normative
weight—that fact that some people prefer itdoes not and cannot impose a duty on others torespect it. If
expressive liberty is a value, there aretwo possibilities. On one hand, if it is plural withthe other values,
then it cannot rank value systems.A society does nothing wrong if its value systemignores or
dramatically discounts expressive liberty, since the fact of value pluralism shows us boththat every value
system must ignore some genuinevalues and that no value is of such preeminentimportance that its
presence or absence changes themoral quality of the value system. On the otherhand, if expressive
liberty both is a value and is ofsuch importance that its instantiation or violationdetermines the moral
quality of value systems, then Galston’s theory disproves our initial hypothesis ofvalue pluralism by
demonstrating that some valuessimply are more valuable than others.
If we are convinced that realist pluralism is the case,then at least as far as Galston’s argument can
help us,it seems that pluralism has no particular normativeconsequences. The fact that pluralism is true
does nothelp us resolve the problems that the condition of pluralism brings about—we have no new
guidance abouthow to live together. As I argue below, this problem isnot unique to Galston’s argument
but is endemic to anyattempt to show that realist pluralism leads to any particular normative outcome.

Williams, Crowder, and “More Is Better ”21
Another attempt to find substantive normative consequences from the fact of pluralism is suggested by
Bernard Williams: “There is the obvious point that ifthere are many and competing genuine values, then
the greater the extent to which a society tends to besingle‐valued, the more genuine values it neglects or
suppresses. More, to this extent, must mean better”(Williams 1979, xvii). George Crowder has devel‐
oped this argument in greater depth (see Crowder1998, 2002, 2007). He writes:
Value pluralism is the idea that there are many objective and intrinsic goods—that is, goods
that are valuable for their own sake as components of human well‐being. Each of these goods
makes its own unique claim on us, requiring ourrespect. Since none of these goods is inherently
superior to any other, we should in that senserespect them all equally. Therefore, when it
comes to pursuing goods, all are equally worthpursuing, and we should pursue them all, as faras
we can do so in the circumstances in whichwe find ourselves. In principle, then, pluralism
commits us to the promotion of as many goodsas possible in a given situation—that is, plural‐
ism generates a principle of maximum diversity.... Roughly speaking, it is generally better
that a society embrace a greater rather than narrower range of values. (Crowder 2007, 132)
If this line of reasoning is correct, then there is aclear, partial rank ordering of value systems that does
not derive from any rank order among the valuesthemselves. Furthermore, it seems at least possible
and perhaps even likely that a liberal social orderwould be more likely to permit the expression of the
largest possible number of values than would nonliberal social orders. Following this logic, it seems that
the fact of realist pluralism may make liberalism morally preferable to other general systems of social
cooperation, and the answer to our question would bethat pluralism leads to liberalism after all. Crowder
makes that claim explicitly: “The argument fromvalue pluralism to liberalism by way of diversity canbe
divided into two principal moves: from pluralismto diversity and from diversity to liberalism”
(Crowder 2007, 131).
But is it true that more is better? A simplified example will be helpful in evaluating this claim.
Imagine three value systems, A, B, and C. A is composed of one real value and one spurious value. The
adherents of system A spend their days carrying outtheir values, and both values are actually expressed in
the lives of the citizens. System B is also composedof two values, but they are both real. The everyday
life of its adherents is also entirely devoted to carrying out the values of the system, and since all of those
values are real, the entirety of that everyday life reflects real values. Finally, C is composed of three
values, all of which are real. Once again, everydaylife is dedicated to carrying out these values, and
since all of them are real, all of that everyday lifereflects real values.
It seems obvious that we have grounds for sayingthat both B and C are morally better than A, since
more of the activities of their adherents instantiategenuine values. In other words, the people who live
by those value systems live lives that are more moral.But Williams and Crowder’s argument is that we also
have grounds for saying that C is morally better thanB, since C instantiates more genuine values. This
cannot be true for the same reasons that B and C aresuperior to A, since the adherents of B and C all live
lives that are, by hypothesis, 100 percent moral. Rather, their claim is that it is better to pursue more
genuine moral values than fewer, even if that meansthat each value in our system gets less time and
attention devoted to it than it would if we tried to instantiate fewer values. (The limit of this argument is
whenthe effort to instantiate additional values interfereswith the instantiation of values already being
put intopractice, such that the total number of values actuallyinstantiated either plateaus or declines.22)
To say that carrying out more moral duties ismorally better than carrying out fewer is to make
carrying out more itself a moral duty. I would not befully (or adequately) moral if I failed to carry out as
many moral duties as I could (given the limitationsof time, energy, and self‐defeating conflicts amongmy

various efforts). Furthermore, Williams andCrowder are claiming that obeying this duty of moral
diversity is not on the same level as other moralduties but is superior to it. If I recognize the duty of
moral diversity but rank it very low in my de factoranking of the various plural values, their argument
implies that I have done something morally unacceptable, a charge that by hypothesis we cannotmake
about any other de facto ranking of the pluralvalues. In other words, the alleged duty to moral pluralism
must be itself a supreme value, whichimposes a rank order not on the plural values but onsystems that
instantiate them.
Where does this alleged duty of moral pluralismcome from? Is it an underappreciated part of our
conception of morality? This would be advantageousto Crowder, since it would justify the duty to diver‐
sity without claiming that it is itself a moral value,thus avoiding the question of whether the duty is
plural with other values. It seems self‐evident thatthe idea of morality requires us to behave in a moral
way at all times. We can rightly reproach peoplewhose lives include some morality but also some
immorality.23 But can we sensibly reproach someonewho has spent his or her entire life doing morally
good things, on the grounds that he or she has notdone a wide enough variety of them? Should we
really say to the volunteer doctor, “Yes, your life wasgood because you spent every waking hour treating
the sick, but your life would have been morallybetter if you had spent some of those hours feedingthe
hungry instead”? It is not obvious that this challenge to the doctor makes sense. We can imaginepeople
of good will disagreeing about the ideal distribution of the doctor’s time. The challenge to thedoctor
does not have the same moral obviousness asthe reproach to the reprobate; the criticism “Youhave
been immoral all the days of your life, and yourlife would have been better if you had been moral
instead” is unobjectionable precisely because actingmorally is intrinsic to the concept of morality. The
fact that we can imagine reasonable disagreementabout the criticism that the doctor has not done
enough kinds of good things suggests that thealleged duty to diversity of goods is not simply partof the
concept of morality.
If moral diversity is not part of the concept ofmorality, what gives it its normative force? In other
words, what gives us a duty to ensure such diversity?The only answer can be that it is itself an
independentmoral obligation. But that leads to a (familiar)dilemma. One possibility is that the duty to
achievemoral diversity is plural with the other moral dutiesand therefore cannot serve as a criterion for
rankingmoral systems, since the other duties have equallyvalid claims to being the ranking criterion,
eventhough they would lead to different rankings. Theother possibility is that the duty to moral
diversity isnot plural with the other values but is in fact a superior moral obligation; in that case, it
would indeed becapable of providing a rank ordering among valuesystems, but it would do so at the
cost of disprovingour initial hypothesis of value pluralism. For thesereasons, it cannot be true both that
values are pluraland that, when it comes to plural values, “more isbetter”—it has to be one or the
other.
These observations also answer the questiondeferred above, about whether value systems with
unequal numbers of values can be ranked againsteach other. The answer appears to be no—there is no
basis, consistent with realist pluralism, for claimingthat a value system that embraces more values is
morally preferable to one that embraces fewer values,or vice versa. The only thing that could rank value
system would be their intrinsic moral quality, but thehypothesis of value pluralism denies that there can
beany such difference among value systems (composedof genuine values). No value or combination of
values is so important that its inclusion would make avalue system superior to all rivals. Therefore, there
isno quality that could rank value systems—not thenumber of values in them and not the quality or
importance of the values in them. Thus, while all pluralists agree that there is no way to rank individual
values, it now also appears that there is no way torank sets or systems of values without violating the
initial premise of pluralism. Overall, Williams andCrowder’s argument seems to have the same problem
that Galston’s did—since the only thing that canimpose a rank order on values or value systems is a
superior moral value, and since the hypothesis ofvalue pluralism holds that there is not any supreme

moral value, it seems that pluralism does not and cannot lead to (or allow) the privileging of any
substantive normative outcome. Recognizing the fact of theplurality of values does not reveal any new
moralduty that might help us grapple with the practicalproblems caused by value conflict.

John Gray’s Bounded Modus Vivendi
John Gray has a different and more modest proposal for finding some help with the problems of value
pluralism. Gray agrees that the fact of value pluralism means that neither liberalism nor any substantive
doctrine can claim a privileged place. For example, he writes, “What does follow from the truth of
pluralism is that liberal institutions can have no universal authority. Where liberal values come into
conflict with others which depend for their existence on non‐liberal social or political structures and
forms of life, and where these values are truly incommensurables, there can—if pluralism is true—be no
argument according universal priority to liberal values. To deny this is to deny the thesis of the
incommensurability of values” (Gray 1996, 155).
Yet, Gray seeks to avoid the apparent relativism of pluralism by arguing that since the plural values
are objectively real moral obligations, they collectively create what he calls a “universal minimum” of
values. He writes: “Strong pluralism does not reject all universal moral claims. It does not deny that
[t]here are universal, pan‐cultural goods and bads. It affirms their reality. It sees such universal values as
marking boundary conditions beyond which worthwhile human lives cannot be lived. For those who are
subject to them the practices of slavery and genocide are insuperable obstacles to a worthwhile human
life; but there are indefinitely many ways of life that lack these and other practices precluded by the
universal minimum of generically human values” (Gray 1998, 23‐24). On this view, we can create at least
a partial ranking of value systems, since some of them will be within the boundaries of the universal
minimum morality and others will be on the outside. While this offers significantly less guidance than
Galston and Williams/Crowder hoped to, it suggests that we can make at least some judgments among
moral systems. Indeed, given the problems that Galston and Crowder/Williams encounter, it seems that
Gray’s binary ranking of value systems is the best that we could possibly do.
However, there are reasons to believe that even Gray’s more modest ranking of value systems may
not genuinely be available to us. Gray has been criticized for his optimism about the content of his uni‐
versal minimum. For example, Gray writes, “In contemporary circumstances, all reasonably legitimate
regimes require a rule of law and the capacity to maintain peace, effective representative institutions,
and a government that is removable by its citizens without recourse to violence. In addition, they
require the capacity to assure the satisfaction of basic needs to all and to protect minorities from
disadvantage. Last, though by no means least, they need to reflect the ways of life and common
identities of their citizens” (Gray 2000, 107). As William Curtis has pointed out, this articulation of the
universal minimum appears to smuggle much of liberalism back into Gray’s modus vivendi (see Curtis
2007, as well as Talisse 2000). The practical effect of that move is to impose limits on pluralism that are
not justifiable from a pluralist perspective. We can easily imagine societies whose value systems deny
the importance of rule of law, representative institutions, or the right to remove the government or that
acknowledge such things as goods but rank them very low in the society’s de facto ordering of goods,
such that they are rarely or never expressed. As long as those values systems consist entirely of genuine
moral values, and assuming as always that our initial premise of realist pluralism is the case, there is no
way that we could claim that such value systems are morally deficient. Gray’s hopeful list of minimum
conditions cannot be justified.
But there is also a more fundamental logical problem with Gray’s effort to identify bright‐line rules for
what is beyond the pale of plural morality. Remember what Gray says about such evils: “For those who
are subject to them the practices of slavery and genocide are insuperable obstacles to a worthwhile
human life . . .” (Gray 1998, 23‐24). For this objection to make sense, we need to read it as Gray’s saying

that denying people the possibility of a worthwhile human life is a moral wrong. In other words, there
has to be some reason why I must view myself as being obligated to either help others live worthwhile
lives, or at a minimum, avoid interfering with their ability to do so. The only thing that can so obligate
me is a moral duty. But if there is genuinely such a moral duty, then it is either plural with the other
duties or it is superior to them. In the first case, the duty to ensure worthwhile lives for others is merely
one duty among many, and there is no principled objection to a society choosing to rank it very low in its
de facto ranking of values. (Although that might seem a bizarre choice when stated so abstractly, it is a
comprehensible choice in practice. For example, members of a salvific religion may see it as acceptable
to enslave infidels to prevent them from committing mortal sins or to kill them for failing to worship
properly. The infidels would not think of themselves as leading worthwhile lives under such
circumstances, and the believers would not feel obligated to take that concern into account.) A value
that is merely one of the plural many cannot establish a bright‐line rule. In the second case, where the
duty to ensure worthwhile lives for others is in fact a supreme duty, Gray’s argument violates the initial
hypothesis of plurality. Thus, either values are truly plural, in which case there are no bright‐line rules,
or values are not all plural with one another, in which case the hypothesis of value pluralism was wrong.
Gray’s goal is to deny that pluralism leads to any particular normative duty (especially liberalism),
while at the same time denying that pluralism leads to relativism. If he could succeed in doing this, he
could demonstrate that there is at least a partial rank ordering of value systems. Even among systems
that are composed entirely of genuine values, on Gray’s view, only those whose ranking of those values
leads to systems that adequately protect the universal minimum morality can be seen as morally
acceptable. (So‐called value systems that contain no genuine values, or that contain spurious values that
actually lead to moral wrongs, are also morally inferior.) While this partial ranking would not reveal a
comprehensive moral duty like the ones that Galston and Williams/ Crowder argue for, it would at least
mark off certain methods of social organization as unacceptable. On this view, pluralism would allow us
to choose among a wide variety of possible ways of life but would avoid the relativistic conclusion that
any system based on genuine values is acceptable. The problem, as I have argued, is that Gray’s
argument does not and cannot work, because he cannot justify the partial ranking without implicitly
assuming that some value is supreme with regard to the others, such that it must always be satisfied
and cannot ever be sacrificed to achieve other values. Accepting that position entails abandoning
pluralism; holding on to pluralism entails abandoning such efforts to rank values and value systems,
because the only thing capable of effecting such a ranking is a value that is morally more important than
all the other values, and pluralism denies that there is any such preeminent value. Simply put, the two
projects are logically incompatible.
Where does this leave us? If we are realist pluralists, we must accept that every system based on one
or more genuine values is plural (that is, unrankable) with regard to every other such system. Perhaps a
quick bit of math will make this problem more vivid. If we assume that there are only twenty genuine
moral values, which seems a very small number, more than one million possible value systems can be
assembled from them. In such a moral universe, a liberal society that seeks to embrace as many values
as possible will be on the same moral footing as a narrow and intolerant society whose institutions and
practices only reflect one genuine value. While we may be able to judge as morally inadequate those
societies that do not reflect any genuine values, we will have no basis for judging among the enormous
number of vastly different societies that do.
If we are irrealist pluralists, the problem is even more profound, since we cannot expect to reach
agreement on whether values are metaphysically real, which (if any) of the many human goods are
actually values, and whether values are plural in the first place. In that moral universe, the relatively
limited relativism of the realist position blossoms into a true relativism, in which each society will
necessarily make its own moral judgments and rankings but in which no society has any reasonable

expectation that other people should agree with its conclusions. In both cases, the potentially profound
problems that relativism poses for political cooperation have no obvious solutions.

Conclusion: Relativism Regained?
My general claim about value pluralism is very simple: if values are moral goods, and if they are
incommensurable and incompatible, then there is no way to rank either the values themselves or the
sets of values that underlie forms of life. This is true whether we make a flat claim to the superiority of
some value (as I believe Berlin does), whether we argue that the fact of pluralism creates a situation
where the violation of an individual’s autonomous expression of his or her values requires moral
justification (as Galston does), whether we argue that a system that permits or instantiates more moral
goods is better than one that instantiates fewer (as Williams and Crowder do), or whether we try to
show that some combinations of values are morally preferable to others (as Gray does). In each case,
the argument necessarily takes the following form: state of affairs A is morally preferable to state of
affairs B. And in response to each such argument, pluralists can and must raise the same basic question:
what makes A morally better than B? When A and B are both states of affairs that are acknowledged as
being morally acceptable because they instantiate genuine moral goods, and if, as I have argued, the
only thing that can make one moral state of affairs morally better than another moral state of affairs is
that it instantiates a more important moral good, then the hypothesis of value pluralism must always
lead to the conclusion that Ais not and cannot be morally superior to B. If ourmoral intuitions tell us that
A really is better than B,then obviously we should try to explain why that isso, but our first step will have
to be to deny the truthof pluralism.
If my argument is correct, value pluralism leads to(or reveals) a version of moral relativism. This is so
whether we approach pluralism as moral irrealists or asmoral realists. This condition of relativism raises
serious concerns about the possibilities of social cooperation. One of the most basic assumptions of
socialorganization is that everyone within a given area orpolity can be led either to adopt the same
values or atleast obey the same institutions. But if it is true thatthere is no definitive way to resolve
conflict over values, value systems, and the institutions that embodyand enforce them, then it seems
that our traditionalbases of cooperation may be threatened. Given limitations of space, I cannot address
adequately the question of what new possibilities for cooperation areavailable to us. Instead, I merely
sketch some reasonsto think that such possibilities may exist. It seems obvious that pluralism leaves
open to us some avenues ofcooperation. To the extent that individuals or ways oflife contingently share
some (or many) values, theywill be able to cooperate on the basis of moral principle. Societies and
individuals who do not find themselves in such substantive agreement would be able topursue a
Hobbesian modus vivendi—cooperationinspired by each participant’s self‐interest. Somesocieties would
probably combine these two strategies,seeking principled agreement in some areas and acooperation
born of enlightened self‐interest in others.With luck, perhaps those thin bases of cooperationcould be
modified or strengthened over time, by thecreation of interpersonal and cultural ties, the emergence of
institutions that many people value for different reasons, or a change in people’s views because ofa
gradual convergence born of mutual respect. Thus,instead of the traditional philosophical goal of
politicalcooperation bounded by moral obligations that allrational actors must acknowledge and obey,
andinstead of a mere Hobbesian ceasefire among mutuallyhostile parties, we could achieve a kind of
layered pluralism, in which individuals and societies cooperate ina wide variety of ways, for a variety of
reasons, someresting on moral duties, others on support for institutions, and yet others on various kinds
of self‐interest.There is much to be dissatisfied with in such a visionof politics, but that may be the
world in which we findourselves.

Notes
1. William Galston offers an excellent brief discussion of the major works (2002, 3-7).
2. For an excellent synthetic overview of the arguments, see Chang (1997).
3. William Galston recently identified as a “major scene of pluralist contention today” the question of “whether Berlinian
value pluralism supports, undermines, or is neutral with respectto liberal democracy” (2006, 753).
4. “Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals
of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or
the whole of mankind” (Berlin 1969, 171).
5. On the notion of a minimum morality, see Gray (1998, 24).
6. “During the past century, thinkers have explored ‘pluralism’ under at least five different rubrics. Political pluralism
emerged in Britain, then migrated to America, as a reaction to doctrines of plenipotentiary state power. William James counterposed metaphysical pluralism to philosophies that claimed the ability to comprehend all truth in single, unified doctrines. Isaiah
Berlin drew a distinction between monism and value pluralism— the thesis that worthy goods and principles are heterogeneous
and cannot be combined into a single best way of living, for individuals or communities. James Madison enjoyed a midcentury
revival in the theory of interest group pluralism. Most recently, John Rawls has cited the fact of pluralism—the diversity charac
teristic of modern societies under circumstances of liberty—as a challenge that legitimate liberal societies must address” (Galston
2006, 751). The present essay is concerned only with value pluralism.
7. Berlin uses the term broadly: “values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps
the most obvious examples” (Berlin 1969, 170). Galston briefly summarizes values as being “worthy goods and principles”
(Galston 2006, 751). Crowder identifies them as “goods that contribute to human flourishing objectively” (Crowder 1998, 8).
Although these definitions differ, they agree in fundamentals. Most importantly, it is not the case that values are values because
they are valued but rather that values are (or should be) valued because they are values—as Crowder and Galston point out, values
are things that are in some sense genuinely or objectively good forhuman beings.
8. “To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest,
seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule
could, in principle, perform. To say that in some ultimate, all-reconciling, yet realizable synthesis, duty is interest, or individual
freedom is pure democracy or an authoritarian state, is to throw a metaphysical blanket over either self-deceit or deliberate
hypocrisy” (Berlin 1969, 171).
9. The inspiration for the distinction between empirical and metaethical pluralisms comes from Crowder (1994) and Wong
(1991).
10.Berlin’s pluralism appears to rely on the idea that one value or a small number of values is superior to the rest of theplural
values, which thus creates at least a partial ordering among value systems. I believe this is his implicit idea in asserting the
primacy of negative liberty. However, I believe that this strategy
ultimately relies on one of the strategies I examine in this essay. We need some reason to believe that negative liberty is prior to
the other values. Since, given the initial hypothesis of value plurality, that reason cannot be the mere assertion of negative lib
erty’s superiority, it must rest on some reason, and Galston andWilliams put forward the most plausible such reasons.
11.Richard Rorty is a thinker who argues that acting as if relativism were the case need not be disabling, although he does
not argue that values are actually relative, because of his belief that we cannot know the metaphysical status of our value beliefs
(see Rorty 1979, 1989). Nietzsche famously argues that values are relative and that that poses no obstacle to achieving any
worthwhile human goal (see Nietzsche 1994).
12.Obviously, liberalism is not the only possible normative response, but it is the one that most recent thinkers have focused
on.
13.Could such contingent values actually be permanently unrankable? Mitchell Silver argues that we cannot make such a
strong claim, since their very contingency means that circumstances could change in a way that made the values rankable. While
this argument seems right in principle, it seems to me to miss the point. Of course irrealist values could be reconciled if things
were very different from how they actually are, but that does not offer any practical advice to people who cannot reconcile their
values today, despite prolonged and conscientious efforts. There is a danger here of mistaking the abstract possibility of a
reconciliation for the reasonableness of expecting one (see Silver 1994).
14.See Rorty (1989). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
15.See Robert Talisse’s concise discussion of these possibilities (Talisse 2000).
16.The fact that the incommensurability of individual values leads logically to the incommensurability of sets of equal
numbers of values suggests that George Crowder is at least partially mistaken when he writes, “Here we should take note of a
fundamental point that is widely underappreciated in the literature of value pluralism and certainly not adequately acknowledged
by either Gray or Galston: the notion of value pluralism is primarily a notion of the plurality and incommensurability of goods,
not ways of life” (Crowder 2007, 134). Since, for the value pluralist, ways of life should be understood as sets of values, the
incommensurability of values does lead to the incommensurability of ways of life. See below for a discussion of the
incommensurability of sets of values that are unequal in number.
17.See, for example, John Kekes’s argument that nonmoral values can, under some circumstances, trump moral values, as
well as his discussion of other literature on this question (Kekes1993, Ch. 9).
18.George Crowder attributes to William Galston, and appears to endorse himself, the view that there may be a hierarchy of
types of plural values. He writes, quoting Galston, “Some goods may be seen as more ‘basic’ than others, ‘in the sense that they

form part of any choiceworthy conception of a human life’—that is, they are universally valid. These basic goods—examples
may include liberty, equality, justice, courage—will override less basic goods where there is a conflict. But they will not
invariably override other basic goods” (Crowder 2007, 125, internal citation omitted). This point is compatible with my claim that
moral goods always outweigh nonmoral goods, assuming that moral goods are more basic in the sense used above. It is also
susceptible to my more general point that attempts to derive liberalism from pluralism inevitably treat some one value as
supreme.
19. Talisse also points out this burden-shifting maneuver (Talisse 2004, 132-135).
20. See a further discussion of this point in Talisse (2004).
21. John Gray could also be seen as arguing that “more is better,” since part of the point of his emphasis on permitting dif
ferent ways of life to flourish is that this is the best way to allow the widest possible expression of the plural values (see below for
a summary of his views).
22. Crowder recognizes this point (Crowder 2007, 132).
23. The hypothesis of pluralism also makes it true that we could reproach people whose lives contain ostensibly morally
neutral activities, since the time spent on those things could be spent instantiating genuine moral goods that are otherwise
neglected in their way of life.
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